Abstract-This paper examines the impact of regulatory reform on productivity growth and its components for Indian banks from 1992 to 2009. We estimate parametric and nonparametric efficiency frontiers, followed by Divisia and Malmquist indexes of total factor productivity, respectively. To account for technology heterogeneity among ownership types, we use a metafrontier approach. Results are consistent across methodologies and show sustained productivity growth, driven mainly by technological progress. Furthermore, results indicate that different ownership types react differently to changes in the operating environment. The position of foreign banks becomes increasingly dominant, and their production technology becomes the best practice in the industry.
I. Introduction
T HE past two decades have witnessed deregulatory policy reforms in banking industries around the world. These reforms have aimed to increase competition in order to promote productive financial systems that ultimately would foster the development of the real economy. Deregulation is usually expected to stimulate productivity growth through the general advancement of production technology and the efficiency improvements of individual banks.
1 Reregulation, on the other hand, is often expected to work as a constraint on the activity of banks with the aim of long-term stability. Empirical evidence to support these assertions is mixed, with some studies reporting improvements in productivity following financial reforms, while others suggest little, no, or even negative productivity growth.
2 Differences in empirical findings are likely to arise from differences in the applied modeling techniques used, difficulties in disentangling the sources of productivity growth (arising from technological progress, scale, or efficiency improvements), and complex relationships between ownership structure and efficiency and productivity changes. 3 It is against this background that we seek to extend previous research by presenting an assessment of the effects of regulatory reforms on productivity growth, its sources, and the relationship between bank performance and ownership types for Indian banks over the period 1992 to 2009. The Indian case is particularly suited to our research questions since it is a representative illustration of a gradualist approach to reform a banking system that was characterized by financial repression. The reforms started in 1992 and were guided by Narasimham Committee reports in 1991 and 1998. The period 1992 to 1997 saw the introduction of policy instruments aimed at promoting competition (deregulation), whereas from 1998 on, the policy focus shifted toward the long-run stability of the banking system (prudential reregulation). 4 The reform process can thus be divided, at least in theory, in two stages, with the year 1997 as the watershed. Moreover, the Indian government introduced a uniform regulatory framework to the different ownership types, which gives us an opportunity to investigate the impact of regulatory reform on the ownership-performance relationship in a market with a level playing field. 5 Methodologically, we use two complementary approaches: a nonparametric metafrontier sequential Malmquist TFP index and a parametric metafrontier Divisia index. To our knowledge, this is the first study to perform an analysis of productivity change and its components within a metafrontier framework in both a parametric and nonparametric setting. To test whether different approaches lead to similar policy conclusions, both share a common framework in terms of data set, variables definition, and behavioral assumptions. Having estimated technology gaps between ownership-specific frontiers and metafrontier, a natural extension is to analyze them more closely and then test for convergence, that is, the attainment of productivity equality in the long run. We do this by using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.
To anticipate our main results, we find that the reforms have fostered sustained TFP growth, driven mainly by technological progress. Results also indicate that state-owned, private, and foreign banks reacted differently to changes in the operating environment. Specifically, regulatory changes generated a very favorable environment for foreign banks, which enabled them to use the best available technology in the industry and engage in cost technology innovation.
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1 The positive impact of financial reforms on the technology of production is typically based on two arguments. First, the overall cost of producing at a given level of output is reduced by declining compliance costs. Second, regulatory reforms usually reduce restrictions on activities, thereby offering the opportunity for banks to take advantage of economies of scale and scope. Efficiency improvements are expected to arise from the increased competitive pressures that reduce managerial inefficiencies.
2 For detailed reviews of the impact of financial reforms on the productivity change of banking systems see, for example, Mukherjee et al. (2001) and Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) .
3 Deregulation seems to increase efficiency for all banks but does not result in interownership convergence (Bonaccorsi di Patti & Hardy, 2005) . Different ownerships react with different speeds to the change of regulatory environment (Isik & Hassan, 2003; Leightner & Lovell, 1998) ; ownership structure becomes neutral in terms of productivity growth, and a diverse ownership structure also functions as a stimulus to market competition (Sturm & Williams, 2004) . A detailed literature review on this issue can be found in Sturm and Williams (2004) . 4 Structural deregulation was characterized by the removal of entry restrictions to private ownership, liberalization of interest rates on deposits and lending, and an increase in the range of permitted activities. Prudential norms related to assets classification, income recognition, provisioning, risk-based capital adequacy, and informational disclosure.
5 See Cole (2009) for a discussion of the relevance of bank ownership and economic growth.
However, the increasing technological gap between best practices and the private and state bank frontiers indicates a lack of significant technological spillovers between different types of bank.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a review of the relevant literature. Section III describes the data set and the variables used in the construction of the estimable models, and section IV presents a detailed exposition of the methodology used. Section V discusses the empirical findings, and finally section VI concludes.
II. Literature Review
A vast literature has investigated bank efficiency, its components, and its determinants using both parametric and nonparametric approaches. 6 Most studies have measured technical and cost efficiency and, to a lesser extent, revenue and profit efficiency and productivity change. While early studies investigate mainly the U.S. and EU banking markets, in recent years the number of studies focusing on developing countries has increased, mainly due to the unprecedented economic reforms implemented in those countries. Indian banking is no exception, and starting from the mid-1990s, the outcomes of the Indian reform process have been extensively analyzed. Bhattacharyya, Lovell, and Sahay (1997) investigated the productivity growth of Indian public sector banks in the pre-reform period and found that nationalization curtailed bank productivity growth. Kumbahakar and Sarkar's (2003) sample included both public sector and private banks in the period 1985 to 1996 and found that reforms did not deliver the expected TFP growth. The empirical literature on developing nations generally finds relatively low efficiency of state-owned institutions. In India, though, a number of studies, using competing methodologies and different time periods, seem to have provided convincing evidence of higher average cost (and profit) efficiency of public sector banks (Sathye, 2003; Bhaumik & Dimova, 2004; Sensarma, 2006; Das & Ghosh, 2006; Zhao, Casu, & Ferrari, 2010; Ray & Das, 2010, among others) . Das and Ghosh (2006) posit that public banks might be more efficient as government ownership may have facilitated recapitalization at the onset of reforms. The literature also seems to agree on the poor performance of smaller private banks and the considerable differences among banks in terms of both efficiency and productivity change.
The fact that the three ownership types coexist and, to a certain extent, compete on the Indian banking market does not imply that they form a homogeneous group. State, private, and foreign ownership entail different organizational forms and incentive structures, which are likely to result in different operational behavior. At the macro level, Bhaumik, Dang, and Kutan (2011) find evidence that different ownership types react differently to monetary policy initiatives of the Reserve Bank of India. These varying reactions might be driven by differences in the structure of their balance sheet, particularly in terms of asset composition (Stein, 1998) . Theory suggests a number of reasons as to why different types of banks lend to different types of firms, mostly based on information asymmetries. For example, Stein (2002) suggests that foreign banks may be less able to process soft information about local firms and therefore may prefer to lend to more transparent larger firms. Foreign banks might also have a comparative advantage in granting large loans. In contrast, state-owned banks often have to lend to priority sectors such as small and medium-size enterprises, state-owned firms, and firms in rural areas. Based on Indian data, Berger et al. (2008) find evidence of these different lending relationships. These significant differences are often overlooked by the existing bank efficiency literature; however, the importance of properly accounting for heterogeneity has been highlighted in a handful of more recent studies (Bos & Schmiedel, 2007; Kontolaimou & Tsekouras, 2010) . The assumption underlying the estimation of efficiency against a common frontier is that all banks in the industry are homogeneous and use the same technology. If this assumption is not correct, it will result in biased estimators and efficiency measures. Koetter and Poghosyan (2009) identify two main types of systematic differences across and within national banking markets: the first type of heterogeneity pertains to the environment in which banks operate and is exogenous to managers, although it affects their choice of available technology. The second type pertains to managerial choices and therefore affects efficiency, that is, the ability to attain the optimum benchmark rather than the shape of the efficient frontier. Our study builds on this more recent strand of literature by employing the metafrontier approach (Battese, Rao, & O'Donnell, 2004; O'Donnell et al., 2008) to account for the possibility of technological differences among ownership types.
III. Data and Variables Definition

A. Data
The data were collected from the Reserve Bank of India and cover all commercial banks (foreign, domestic private, and state owned) operating in India from 1992 until 2009.
With the guide of homogeneity criteria and in line with previous literature, we excluded regional rural banks and foreign banks that consistently had fewer than two branches over the entire sample period. In both cases, their lines of business are very different from the nationwide operations of other commercial banks. The resulting sample is an unbalanced panel data set of 1,230 observations. Table 1 gives a snapshot of the relative weight of the three ownership categories and how the sample relates to the total mar-ket (proportion of total assets). All data were deflated using the GDP deflator using 1994 as base year.
B. Variable Definition
To identify the inputs and outputs variables, we follow the intermediation approach (Sealey & Lindley, 1977) and employ a two-input, three-output specification. The three chosen outputs are performing loans (y 1 ), other earning assets (y 2 ), and fee-based income (y 3 ). 7 The revenues with respect to these three outputs are given by interest income on loans, interest income on total other earning assets, and noninterest income, respectively. 8 The two chosen inputs are total loanable funds (the sum of deposits and money market funding) and noninterest operating cost (which includes both the cost of the labor input and physical capital). The price for total loanable funds (w 1 ) is calculated as the ratio of total interest expenditure to total loanable funds, and the price for noninterest operating cost (w 2 ) is given by the ratio between noninterest operating cost and total assets. The number of branches is also introduced separately to proxy for size. Summary statistics for outputs and inputs are given in table 2.
To account for the macroeconomic environment and prevent bias especially in the estimation of technical change, we also include the cash reserve ratio (CRR), the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR), and a measure of the reliance of the economy on the banking sector as opposed to other sources of finance (Mac). Finally in the econometric specification, we also specify a dummy variable R to capture the period before and after reregulation (before and after 1997).
IV. Methodology
A. Empirical Framework
The measurement of total factor productivity change (TFP) and its components can be performed by the estimation of efficiency frontiers, using either stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) or data envelopment analysis (DEA), which lead respectively to the calculation of a Divisia index of TFP change and of a Malmquist index of TFP (Malmquist, 1953) . 9 In this paper, we make a number of methodological contributions to the literature. First, we use both parametric and nonparametric techniques because they have wellknown complementary properties, and consistency in their results strengthens the analysis and is particularly useful for regulators and other decision makers (Bauer et al., 1998; Casu et al. 2004) . To improve comparability, we implement a sequential DEA approach (Tulken & Vanden Eeckaut, 1995) , which leads to the estimation of a sequential Malmquist TFP index. In addition, unlike most of the literature, for the decomposition of the Malmquist index we do not follow Färe et al. (1994) , since their method, albeit very popular, is valid only under the assumption of constant returns to scale. We follow instead the method proposed by Ray and Desli (1997) , which is valid under variable returns to scale and allows the proper separation of scale effects from the rest. Finally, we recognize the heterogeneous nature of our data across ownership types, and therefore we address this issue in the context of a metafrontier framework (Battese et al., 2004; O'Donnell et al., 2008) . We then estimate both a nonparametric sequential metafrontier Malmquist TFP index and a parametric metafrontier Divisia index to assess productivity change. In an input minimization perspective, an efficiency frontier is defined as the minimum level of input(s) for a given level of output(s), and the efficiency of a firm can be measured by means of a distance function D (Shephard, 1953, Reports the proportion of total assets of our sample over the whole industry.
7 Performing loans are measured as the difference between total loans and nonperforming loans. Other earning assets aggregate government securities, other approved securities, shares, debentures and bonds, subsidiaries and joint ventures, and other investment outside India (total investment).
8 According to the accounting practice followed by the Indian banking sector after 1992, income accrual would cease once the loan is recognized as nonperforming. Therefore, the interest received on loans recorded in the loss and profit account is associated with the performing loans. 9 For a general review of the methodological approaches to efficiency and productivity measurement, see, for instance, Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (2008) .
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). This is a radial measure of the distance of that firm from the frontier such that D ¼ 1 when the firm is fully efficient and D > 1 otherwise. Data envelopment analysis constructs a piece-wise linear convex frontier from the linear combination of the best practices among the observations (Charnes, Cooper, & Rhodes, 1978 . In the case of i ¼1,. . .,N, firms that produce m ¼1,. . ., M outputs using j ¼1. . ., J inputs at time t and with variable returns to scale, the efficiency of each firm is calculated by solving the following linear programming problem (once for each firm):
where
For the calculation of TFP, we follow Ray and Desli (1997) and define the Malmquist index for the kth ownership between any two times t and t þ 1 and with variable returns to scale as
From equation (2), we can see that the Malmquist index is calculated as the ratio of distance functions, and it is given by the product of three components: the change in efficiency (EC), technological change (TC), and scale change (SC). 10 For each of these components, a score larger or smaller than unity indicates an improvement or worsening of the corresponding measure, and a score equal to 1 indicates no change. The same is true for the overall TFP measure resulting from the multiplication of the three scores.
Equation (1) is usually estimated separately for each time period, and the resulting Malmquist index therefore compares year pairs every time independently. This often translates into wide oscillations, as shifts of the frontier induced by random shocks are confused with changes in technology. We avoid this problem by estimating equations (1) and (2) sequentially (Tulken & Vanden Eeckaut, 1995) . This means that the estimation of equation (1), and therefore subsequently of equation (2), is conducted each time including not only the current year but also all the years preceding it, which is equivalent to assuming that technological knowledge accumulates over time. 11 The sequential estimation also has the additional advantage of reducing the well-known dimensionality problem of DEA, and it also enhances the comparability with SFA that uses time trends to model technological change (O' Donnell et al., 2008) .
12
The stochastic frontier model is an econometric method that consists of a (cost or production or profit) function with a composite error term, made up of two separate, although jointly estimated, components: stochastic noise and inefficiency (Aigner, Lovell, & Schmidt, 1977; Meeusen & Van den Broek, 1977) . In this paper, we estimate a stochastic translog cost frontier with nonconstant inefficiency whose mean depends on a set of covariates (Battese & Coelli 1995) . 13 We choose a translog functional form, so our model is 
In equation (4), e it $N(0,r 2 e ) is truncated at the variable point Àd 0 Z it to allow for the nonnegativity constraint on u it , so that e it ! Àd 0 Z it . In equation (3) C it is the observed total operating cost of bank i at time t, and it depends on inputs prices w and outputs y. R is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for the period following reregulation (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) and T is time. Together with their interaction with inputs and outputs, they model (neutral and nonneutral) technical change and changes in technology following reregulation. The exogenous environmental variables that we described in the data section are in the vector E. Equation (4) models inefficiency as a function of time and reregulation, as the relevance of the difference between ownerships is already captured by the estimation of separate frontiers.
14 Equations (3) and (4) are estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood.
Following the procedure outlined in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) , we define and calculate the Divisia index of TFP change for each of the k ownerships as , representing departures from marginal cost pricing or from an equi-proportionate markup for every output (Denny, Fuss, & Waverman, 1981; Kumbhakar & Lozano-Vivas, 2005) .
To compute equation (5) for the ownership-specific cases we use the parameters' estimates of equations (3) and (4).
C. The Estimation of Metafrontiers
When firms in different groups (countries, industry, ownership types, and so on) face different technologies, their (production or cost functions and) frontiers have to be estimated separately, precluding the possibility of comparisons among them. More formally, if there are k different technology sets in an input perspective at every time t, there will be k different input sets, each defined as
The idea behind the metafrontier is that all L k t sets belong to a common unrestricted technology set L* t ,
to which each of the k groups has potential access.
The metafrontier is defined as the boundary of this unrestricted technology set, and it is derived as the envelope of the group frontiers, identifying a metatechnology that is assumed to be available to all the firms in the sample.
In SFA the metafrontier is estimated by linear or quadratic programming (Battese et al., 2004) as an overarching function that envelops the single group frontiers. Define
as the k-th group cost frontier, depending on the matrix of independent variables X and a vector of group-specific parameters b k . The metafrontier can be defined as the envelope of the k estimations of equation (6) as
It has the same functional form of equation (6) with a vector of parameters b* that has to be estimated subject to the constraint that
to ensure that the meta-cost technology gives the minimum possible cost available among all the groups. Equation (7) can be estimated by linear programming, hence solving
subject to equation (8) . 15 The radial distance of each unit from the metafrontier is called metaefficiency and it is defined as
14 As we will see, this choice is based on a test of whether the data can be pooled. 15 In equation (9) the hat notation indicates the estimator of the corresponding parameter.
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which, given equation (6), is equivalent to
Equation (11) means that the metaefficiency of firm i of group k at time t is made of two parts. The first is its groupspecific cost efficiency EFF k it ¼ expðÀu k it Þ, with 0 EFF k it 1. The second is known as the technological gap ratio (TGR), which measures the distance between the metafrontier and the group-specific frontier; TGR 1, with higher values indicating a closer proximity to the metafrontier and lower values indicating a larger gap between the two. Empirically one would first estimate EFF k and TGR and compute EFF* subsequently as their product.
In DEA, which is already a linear programming technique, the estimation of a metafrontier is the estimation of a general unrestricted frontier using all the group data together. Similar to SFA, in DEA we will also have
Coming finally to the calculation of TFP change, this has to be based on the metafrontier results. For the Divisia index, we perform the calculations in equation (5) using the estimated coefficients from the metafrontier obtained from equations (9) and (8). Given the specification of equation (10) and to avoid double-counting of technological progress, the cost efficiency measure used in the Divisia has to remain the group-specific cost efficiency.
The metafrontier Malmquist index is computed as in equation (2) but using the metatechnology as a reference point so that
V. Empirical Results
To test whether the various ownership types are operating under the same technology and therefore the data can be pooled under a single frontier, we used both parametric and nonparametric techniques: t-test, Mann-Whitney, Kruskall-Wallis (KW) test, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test for DEA, as well as an LR test in SFA (Aly et al., 1990; Elyasiani & Mehdian, 1992; Isik & Hassan, 2002) . The results, reported in table A1 in the online appendix to this paper, show that the null hypothesis of a common technology is generally rejected, leading us to conclude that it is appropriate to construct cost-efficiency frontiers separately for each ownership group.
A. Ownership-Specific Analysis of Total Factor Productivity
The first part of the analysis consists of estimating ownership-specific frontiers and their TFP changes and components. For the parametric analysis, we follow Battese and Coelli (1995) and estimate equations (3) and (4) simultaneously with a maximum likelihood one-step procedure. Linear homogeneity of degree 1 in input prices and Young's symmetry are imposed prior to estimation. In the nonparametric analysis, we follow a sequential Data Envelopment Analysis approach (Tulken & Vanden Eeckaut, 1995) . This particular approach assumes that technical knowledge accumulates over time, hence implying dependence in the production process. This reduces the wide oscillations typical of DEA, as the frontier will be moving forward in the presence of technical progress and remain static otherwise. The use of sequential DEA should improve the comparability of the two methodologies. Nonetheless, due to the fundamental characteristics of the two approaches, we would expect the DEA results to be more extreme and, in the presence of technological progress, to show larger technology changes than efficiency changes.
The most important points to notice about this initial part of the analysis are that the SFA coefficients and elasticities have the expected signs, inefficiency is significant for all ownerships, and the passing of time and the introduction of reregulation have mixed effects on the technological choices of the three ownerships.
16 Furthermore, foreign banks show an increase in the optimal scale of production of performing loans and a decrease in that of other earning assets, contrary to both private and state banks. This is consistent with the removal of restrictions on their operations, which progressively allowed foreign banks to increasingly familiarize themselves with the local loans market. As illustrated in table 3, both SFA and DEA show high average levels of efficiency (about 90%) that slightly worsen after reregulation; these results are not significantly different between the two methodologies, with the exception of private banks, which DEA ranks as remarkably less efficient than SFA.
17
Moving on to the measurement of productivity, as we can see in table 4, TFP overall is increasing over time, and the difference between the DEA Malmquist and the SFA Divisia is not statistically significant. The only difference between the two methodologies is in the estimates of technology change, but the general trends and the actual change rates of TFP are not statistically different.
18 This improvement is mainly due to improvements in technology, with DEA recording, as expected, higher values than SFA.
These ownership-specific results do not allow us to draw any inference at the industry level. Therefore, to compare results across ownership groups, we move on to compute estimates relative to a metafrontier.
B. Metafrontier Analysis of Total Factor Productivity
We estimate metafrontiers using both DEA and SFA techniques, followed by a generalized sequential metafrontier Malmquist index and a metafrontier Divisia index. To allow a more flexible modeling of the passing of time on technology in SFA, we estimate two separate metafrontiers-one for 1992-1997 and one for 1998-2009. 19 The coefficients of the two SFA-based metafrontiers are reported in table A3 in the online appendix to this article. Tables 5 and 6 report the metafrontier Divisia index results and the metafrontier Malmquist index results derived from SFA and DEA, respectively.
The results are very consistent across methodologies, the comparable series are not significantly different at a 5% level (except from scale changes) and find an increase in overall TFP, especially after 1998. If we do not take into account the environmental factors in the Divisia index, the figures are even closer (refer to column TFP2 in table 5), with an overall average yearly improvement between 0.4% and 1.4% before 1998 and increasing to about 3% per year afterward. The main contributor to these TFP changes is always technological progress. As expected, in DEA this is more marked and translates into a worsening of efficiency, whereas SFA gives lower technical improvements and marginally positive efficiency changes. Finally, the scale component worsens in all cases, going from mildly increasing returns to scale before 1997 to mildly decreasing returns to scale after 1998.
C. Metaefficiency and Technology Gap Ratios
The metafrontier framework allows us to decompose differences in overall performance (metaefficiency) into a cost efficiency and technology gap ratio (TGR), where the TGR measures the distance between the group frontiers and the metafrontier. 20 While cost efficiency relates mainly to the performance of a firm's management, the TGR represents the nature of the production environment (O'Donnell et al., 2008) . In this context, regulatory changes influence the environmental characteristics of the market; therefore, an analysis of technology gaps can provide important information on the outcomes of the deregulation process. Table 7 reports the average technology gap ratios (TGR), cost efficiency, and metaefficiency scores for the whole industry and the different ownerships for DEA and SFA. The table shows that industry technology improves over To make the comparison possible, we transformed the TFP growth rate of the Divisia index into a TFP growth as the Malmquist. 19 We also estimated a single metafrontier for the entire time period. The results were unsatisfactory and therefore are not reported. 20 As discussed in the methodology section, TGR is computed as the ratio of metaefficiency to cost efficiency.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS time, as indicated by the widening gap between the metafrontier and the single ownership frontiers (the decreasing TGR values). 21 In particular, while before 1998 state banks are the sector leaders in terms of technology and metaefficiency, after 1998 they lose technological leadership in favor of foreign banks. This is true for both DEA and SFA.
This improvement in the position of foreign banks is confirmed when we look at individual data points and calculate the number and sample proportion of technology leaders for each ownership. In this context, we define technology leaders or innovators as those banks with a TGR of 1-those that are using the best available technology. This is shown in table 8, where again we can see the increasingly dominant position of foreign banks after 1998. The superscript * indicates results obtained with reference to the metafrontier. As in equation (5), the TFP change rate of the Divisia index is given by the sum of scale effect (SC), technical change (TC), the effects of environmental variables (EX), allocative efficiency (ALLC), cost efficiency (EC), and the mark-up effect (MU). TFP2 reports overall TFP without taking into account the environmental factors not accounted for in the Malmquist index. The superscript * indicates results obtained with reference to group the metafrontier. TFP ¼ total factor productivity; TC ¼ technical change; EC ¼ efficiency change; SC ¼ scale change.
22
21 Recall that increases in the technological gap ratios imply decreases in the gap between the group frontier and the metafrontier. The higher the ratio, the closer the group frontier is to the metafrontier (the best available technology) and vice versa. 22 The notable difference in the absolute number of technology leaders between the two methodologies is explained by their deterministic versus stochastic nature. Indeed if we were to lower the threshold even just to 99% for SFA the results would be remarkably closer.
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To corroborate these results, in figures 1 and 2 we present the histograms and kernel density estimations of technology gap ratios for the three ownership types, separately for the periods 1992 to 1997 and 1998 to 2009. The figures quite clearly show how the TGR distribution changes after 1998, with state banks in particular losing their lead position, while the concentration of leaders for foreign banks becomes higher than for the rest of the sample.
D. Catch-Up Index
Although the TGR is very informative, it is a static measure of leadership. To look further into the issue of technological leadership, we follow Chen and Yang (2011) and construct a catch-up index, given by the ratio of the technical change of the i-th bank against the metafrontier (TC Ã it ) to its technical change against the k-th ownership frontier (TC k it ), that is,
CU therefore measures the dynamics of the changes in technological leadership among different ownership types, with lower values indicating a speeding up of the catch-up process and vice versa. The results are reported in table 9; they are not significantly different between DEA and SFA and indicate that the best practices among foreign banks are narrowing their technical gap at a faster speed than state or private banks are. The speed of the catch-up process decreases over time for all ownership types. State banks appear to be the slowest in the sample in terms of catching up with the best available technology. The overall picture therefore seems to indicate that the change in regulatory regime generated a very favorable environment for the best practices of foreign banks to use the best available technology and engage in cost technology innovation.
E. Further Robustness and Convergence Test
Finally, to check on the robustness of our conclusion, we test for the convergence of the ownership-specific frontiers toward the metafrontier, based on a reduced form of their respective dynamic processes (see, for example, Thirtle et al., 2003) . Define TC k t as the change of technology of the kth ownership frontier at time t and TC Ã t as the change of 
and ln TC
where g k and g* are the asymptotic growth rates of TC k and TC Ã , respectively, and l measures the speed of catch-up between them. Combining equations (14) and (15), we get
We estimate equation (16) for each of the ownership types, using both DEA and SFA results, and conduct an ADF test to check for the presence of a unit root; the presence of a unit root (l ¼ 0) implies that there is no technological spillover between the metafrontier and the ownership-specific frontiers. Conversely, the difference between them will be stationary if the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected and l > 0, with full convergence found if the intercept (g kg*) is not significantly different from 0. The results of the tests are reported in table 10 and indicate that only the frontier of foreign banks converges consistently across methodologies toward the metafrontier in the long run. This confirms our conclusion that the metafrontier is led by foreign banks and suggests a lack of significant technological spillovers between ownerships.
VI. Conclusion
The main aim of this study is to assess the impact of regulatory reform on TFP growth and its sources and on the This is an ADF test with one lagged difference term. We report directly the value of l and its p-value is the MacKinnon p-value.
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ownership-performance relationship for the case of Indian banks. We do so by implementing a novel methodological framework that leads to the estimation of TFP by means of a nonparametric sequential metafrontier Malmquist index and a parametric metafrontier Divisia index.
Guided by two Narasimham Committee reports (in 1991 and 1998), the Indian government introduced a series of financial sector reforms that fostered a uniform regulatory framework, theoretically creating a market with a level playing field. Despite the fact that nearly two decades have passed since the first Narasimham Committee report, we find evidence of continued heterogeneity across the industry. Departing from the existing literature on efficiency and productivity measurement, we explicitly test and reject the assumption of the existence of a common production technology, leading us to construct cost-efficiency frontiers separately for each ownership type. Both DEA and SFA results indicate relatively high levels of efficiency, which worsen after 1998. Results are consistent across methodologies for state-owned and foreign banks. Private banks are, however a very heterogeneous group, and experience the largest number of entries (particularly after 1996) as well as exits or M&As. Research shows that the performance of firms entering the market is normally below that of the average incumbent. When new small firms enter and exit the market, the variance of the distribution is likely to increase, and this can explain the lower efficiency of private banks measured by DEA compared to SFA. Overall productivity, measured by both the DEA Malmquist and the SFA Divisia, is increasing over time. Consistent with previous literature, we find that this improvement is mainly due to improvements in technology.
To be able to compare the results across ownership types, we estimate a generalized sequential metafrontier Malmquist index and a metafrontier Divisia index. Again, the overall TFP is positive and mainly driven by technological progress. Results also indicate that different ownership types reacted differently to changes in policy and to the operating environment. In particular, changes in the regulatory regime generate a very favorable environment for foreign banks, which enables them to use the best available technology in the industry and engage in cost technology innovation. The position of foreign banks becomes increasingly dominant over time, and their production technology becomes the best available technology in the industry. This is consistent with the removal of restrictions on their operations, which progressively allows foreign banks to familiarize themselves with the local loan market. Foreign banks seem to have capitalized on the relative advantages of their asset portfolio. On the other hand, the increasing technological gap between the best practice and the private and state banks frontier indicates a lack of significant technological spillovers.
To conclude, financial reforms have benefited the Indian banking sector and resulted in sustained productivity growth. However, the benefits of reforms have not being uniformly distributed across ownership types, with stateowned banks losing the ability to act as undisputed industry leaders, as well as losing customers and market share. An interesting extension to the current study would be a microlevel analysis of the characteristics and determinants of ownership differences, with a focus on bank risk.
